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Abstract—The interconnection of resource-constrained and globally accessible things with untrusted and unreliable Internet make
them vulnerable to attacks including data forging, false data injection, and packet drop that affects applications with critical decision-
making processes. For data trustworthiness, reliance on provenance is considered to be an effective mechanism that tracks both data
acquisition and data transmission. However, provenance management for sensor networks introduces several challenges, such as low
energy, bandwidth consumption, and efficient storage. This paper attempts to identify packet drop (either maliciously or due to network
disruptions) and detect faulty or misbehaving nodes in the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) by following a
bi-fold provenance-enabled packed path tracing (PPPT) approach. Firstly, a system-level ordered-provenance information encapsulates
the data generating nodes and the forwarding nodes in the data packet. Secondly, to closely monitor the dropped packets, a node-level
provenance in the form of the packet sequence number is enclosed as a routing entry in the routing table of each participating node.
Lossless in nature, both approaches conserve the provenance size satisfying processing and storage requirements of IoT devices.
Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed scheme with respect to provenance size, provenance generation time, and energy
consumption.
Index Terms—data trustworthiness, IPv6, IoT, LLN, lossless provenance, RPL, sensor network, 6LoWPAN.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Net-work (6LoWPAN) [1], [2] has enabled the intercon-
nection of things and the Internet, thus forming the Inter-
net of Things (IoT). Considering the connectivity between
low-power and lossy 6LoWPAN networks with resource-
constrained things, Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (RPL) has been standardized as one of the
candidate protocols by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) routing over low power and lossy network (ROLL)
group to address the issues including scarce resources, lossy
link characteristics and different routing requirements [3].
RPL is a proactive distance vector protocol for low power
and lossy networks (LLNs) that operates by establishing
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) based on a set of routing
metrics and constraints. Despite having the cutting-edge
crypto-based solutions to provide data security, the self-
configuring sensor nodes operated by RPL are susceptible to
various attacks [4] especially due to the global accessibility
of unattended things.
By default, the RPL implementations do not enable se-
cure operation modes. Therefore, malicious nodes can make
the network vulnerable to multiple attacks [5]. For instance,
attacks on data (e.g., data forging, false data injection, data
fabrication, and data replay), and attacks causing network
disruptions (e.g., resource depletion, network congestion,
packet loss, link quality degradation, and hole creation). In
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addition to these attacks, the untrustworthy data traversal
across unattended sensor nodes may cause issues during
data debugging, data verification and data authenticity [6].
Data trustworthiness is an important requirement es-
pecially for applications relying on sensor data for criti-
cal decision-making processes, risk assessment, and perfor-
mance evaluation. To enforce trustworthy data in transit and
routing with quality of services (QoS), it is essential to keep
track of the complete data propagation path. Such tracking
of data can be formulated through Provenance. Provenance
is a meta-data describing the complete lineage of data and
a set of actions performed on data [7]. Provenance ensures
the integrity of data during data debugging, reconciliation,
replication, decision making, performance tuning, auditing,
and forensic analysis [8].
Provenance has been extensively studied in a variety of
application areas including databases, scientific work-flows,
distributed systems, and networks. It has many ingredients
(for instance, confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy,
and non-repudiation) as discussed in [8]. In wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), the idea of incorporating provenance has
been discussed in [9]–[15]. In comparison to WSNs, the idea
of provenance in the IoT is yet to be explored keeping in
view the challenging requirements and constraints associ-
ated with the novel architecture of the IoT. For instance,
in the IoT, things are globally accessible, operating in an
unattended environment, resource constrained in nature,
and connected through the lossy links. Keeping in view the
constraints associated with IoT and the challenges associ-
ated with provenance collection mechanism [16], it is more
feasible to take into account the recommended underlying
protocol for IoT devices such as RPL. Such consideration
allows the exploitation of existing infrastructure of the pro-
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2tocol, and hence, put less burden on the resource-consuming
nodes during provenance collection and validation. In this
regard, introducing provenance scheme for RPL-connected
IoT devices is a viable option because RPL is a highly
recommended protocol for sensor motes.
In this paper, we have focused on formulating a
provenance-based framework for RPL-based IoT networks
by introducing Provenance-based Packet Path Tracing (PPPT)
scheme. The proposed scheme not only captures the data
generating source nodes but also makes the intermediate
nodes accountable for forwarding the packet to the desti-
nation, ensuring trustworthy and quality data in resource
constrained things. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
• We investigate the significance of integrating prove-
nance in RPL-based IoT by highlighting the problem
of providing data trustworthiness in sensor motes.
• With reference to the resource-constrained things, we
propose a lossless provenance scheme that operates
by acquiring system-level provenance information re-
garding the path traversed by the packet. For node-
level provenance, we exploit the routing information in
the routing table at intermediate nodes by including
the packet sequence number in the routing table.
The inclusion of both system-level and node-level
provenance helps in detecting malicious nodes or
configuration of other network discrepancies.
• To mitigate the need for processing the forged or
missing provenance in the data packet and to speed
up the process of data trust assessment, we set a bit
in IPv6 extension header (EH).
• We design a packet path provenance encoding and
decoding mechanisms for RPL storing mode partic-
ularly for Multipoint to Point (M2P) scenario. We
evaluate the proposed technique with respect to
provenance size, provenance generation time, addi-
tional storage overhead in terms of RAM and ROM,
robustness and energy consumption metrics.
• We provide a comparison in terms of provenance
generation time and average power consumption
between RPL-only and the proposed provenance-
enabled RPL PPPT scheme.
• We also compare our approach with bloom filter (BF)
based techniques [10], [11] and Provenance as ID
(PID) [16] in terms of provenance size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of RPL protocol. Section 3 discusses
the significance for integration of provenance in the IoT
and the associated challenges. Section 4 introduces the sys-
tem model. Section 5 describes the provenance encoding
and decoding algorithms. Section 6 discusses the security
analysis of our approach. Section 7 presents the simulation
results. Section 8 surveys related work, and finally, Section
9 concludes the paper with future work.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE RPL PROTOCOL
RPL is a standardized routing protocol for the IP-connected
IoT. It creates a Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic
Graph (DODAG) and supports 2 modes of operation
aaaa::1
aaaa::2 aaaa::3
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aaaa::7
aaaa::5 aaaa::6
aaaa::8 aaaa::10aaaa::9
rank=r
rank=r+2
rank=r+1
rank=r+3
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DIO
Fig. 1: A sample RPL DODAG instance showing multipoint-to-point
scenario. Each node has a unique IPv6 address. Each parent node
maintains a neighboring table (NT) and routing table (RT). For example,
node 3 keeps information about its neighboring nodes (1, 2, 5, 6) in NT
and also routing entries (5, 6, 8, 9, 10) in RT.
including uni-directional traffic from nodes to the root
node (Multipoint-to-Point), and bi-directional traffic be-
tween nodes and the root node (Point-to-Multipoint and
Point-to-Point). A typical RPL DODAG is shown in Fig. 1
where each node has a node ID (an IPv6 address), one parent
(preferred parent) or more parents (substitute parents), and
a list of neighbors.
2.1 DODAG Topology Formation
RPL uses three types of control messages i.e., DODAG
Information Object (DIO), DODAG Information Solicita-
tion (DIS), and DODAG Destination Advertisement Object
(DAO) for creating and maintaining RPL topology [17]. The
RPL DODAG topology formation process is triggered by
the root node by emitting DIO messages after neighbor
discovery. The DIO message contains information about
RPL Instance, DODAG, objective function (OF) and other
configuration parameters. Upon the reception of DIO, the
neighboring nodes compute their rank (i.e., the position of
a node with respect to root node) based on the OF. The DIO
message also informs about downward or upward routing
based on Mode of Operation (MOP) flag. In case the down-
ward routes are preferred, the child nodes would trigger the
DAO messages in order to advertise their reachability in the
DODAG towards their parents along with DAO lifetime and
other parameters. A new node may join an existing network
by broadcasting a DIS message in order to solicit a DIO
message from a neighboring node. The control messages
containing the routing information and other metrics dis-
seminate information aperiodically, whereas the periodicity
is determined through the trickle timer algorithm [18].
2.2 Packet Routing
In a DAG, a node may either act as a source node
(also known as data generating node) or a forwarding
node/aggregator node. In order to send a packet from
source to destination (typically root node), the source node
3Fig. 2: IoT application showing the interconnection of resource-
constrained nodes to the Internet.
forwards the packet to its preferred parent that takes the
forwarding decision based on the routing information in its
routing table (RT) until it arrives at destination (root) node.
The root usually performs the job of information retrieval,
data processing or data aggregation.
3 PROVENANCE-AWARE IOT SYSTEM FOR
RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED NODES
The IoT is gaining ground as a pervasive presence around us
comprising of a variety of things or objects – such as RFID
tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, and others that
are able to interact with each other or with their neighbor
nodes through unique addressing schemes to reach common
goals [19]. Fig. 2 shows the interconnection of resource-
constrained nodes with the Internet. The things composing
the IoT are limited by low resources in terms of both
computation and energy capacity and therefore, they can-
not implement complex schemes supporting security. The
deployed sensor motes in a smart city scenario (as shown in
Fig. 2) have low storage capacity ranging from 8KB to 16KB.
Furthermore, IoT is extremely vulnerable to attacks because
(i) they operate in unattended domain, (ii) eavesdropping
and data loss in lossy wireless communication, (iii) compo-
nents are characterized by low capabilities in terms of both
energy and computing resources. Hence, unquestionably
the data from sensor nodes require trustworthiness that can
be achieved through provenance. Integration of provenance
in resource-consuming nodes is a challenging task because
of limited communication data rate, memory, energy, and
processing constraints. Employing a forensic-aware system
as data provenance in these resource-hungry devices to
establish the authenticity of data entails a contemplation. In
this section, we discuss the need for introducing provenance
in the IoT. We also investigate the challenges associated with
IoT-aware provenance system.
3.1 Motivation: Integration of Provenance in the IoT
Cost effective miniaturized devices with computational and
networking capabilities are providing promising solutions
to optimize the comfort and quality life style in various
Control center
Nuclear Reactor
      Sensory nodes 
      Gateway       
Fig. 3: Nuclear reactor scenario showing sensory nodes relaying data
to the control center.
pervasive application areas including domotics, smart cities,
smart grid, environment monitoring, meteorology, energy
management, health-care systems, industrial automation,
and precision agriculture. According to US National Intel-
ligence Council (NIC), by 2025 Internet nodes may reside
in everyday things such as food packages, furniture, paper
documents, and more [20]. Despite these benefits, the revo-
lutionary technology of IoT is vulnerable to security issues
causing user dissatisfaction (for instance, random bugs),
privacy violation (for instance, eavesdropping1)2, mone-
tary loss (for instance, denial-of-service attacks or ransom-
ware3), or even loss of life (for instance, attackers controlling
vehicles4, triggering malicious instructions to jeopardize a
patient’s life by hacking of Medtronic insulin pump5 to
dose fatal amount of insulin to diabetes patients, and hack-
ing implantable cardiac devices including pacemakers and
defibrillators to deplete the battery or administer incorrect
pacing or shocks6) [21]. Therefore, it is critical to ensure
trustworthy data communication in the IoT.
In the IoT, provenance represents the meta-data that
keeps track of the data-generating node (source node) and
set of actions performed on data by the intermediate (for-
warding) nodes. In RPL network, the UDP packet only
contains source and destination fields and thus have no
information about the intermediate nodes traversed by the
packet. Hence, the malicious nodes can intercept data result-
ing in false data propagation or false routing information.
We consider the following case studies to illustrate
the significance of data trustworthiness in an IoT-enabled
paradigm.
a) Case Study I (Nuclear Reactors): System debugging
and performance tuning of parameters
Consider a nuclear reactor where sensors (for instance,
temperature, flow, pressure or level) are deployed in order
to monitor (heating system, water pressure or water level)
and notify sensors’ readings (temperature measurements or
water level) to a control room (as shown in Fig. 3). The
control room is responsible for making critical decisions (to
turn on/off any valve or to adjust any values) based on the
1. Data from connected CloudPets teddy bears leaked and ransomed
exposing kid’s voice messages, CNET, February 2017.
2. Spying kettles and electric irons, BBC, November 2013.
3. Hospitals across the UK hit by WannaCrypt ransom-ware cyberat-
tack, ZDNet, May 2017.
4. Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway with Me in It,
WIRED, July 2015.
5. Medtronic probes insulin pump risks, Reuters, October 2011.
6. Vulnerabilities found in St.Jude Medical implantable cardiac de-
vices, ZDNet, September 2017.
4sensors readings. This working environment may raise the
following queries:
• The scientists want to analyze the behavior of the
system (throughput) against any particular set of
values. How to tune the parameters based on digital
sensors values?
• The scientists want to observe the working of cur-
rent operations to figure out the problem in system
settings. How to debug the system by evaluating the
sensor values?
• A traitor eavesdrops on the sensor data and forged
the sensor values (increase or decrease the tempera-
ture values) for instance, the destruction caused by
Stuxnet worm [22] in Iran’s nuclear plant. How can
the control room validate the data values from sensors?
• How to identify that the disruptions in the system
are either because of internal flaw or any malicious
activity?.
• How to resolve intermittent errors in the system?.
b) Case Study II (Smart Cities): Availability and Reliabil-
ity of sensor data
In smart cities, sensors can be deployed in many sectors
including monitoring crops for precision agriculture, traffic
analysis, environmental (air and water quality) monitor-
ing, energy management, identifying parking spaces, health
care, food quality, and many others sensors to control and
automate the daily life activities. Setting up such an infras-
tructure surrounded by sensors requires a careful continu-
ous monitoring of the sensor devices itself. For instance,
• Aging management is required to check for faulty
sensors that are giving abnormal deviations in results.
Similarly, to handle the issues of intermittent errors
usually more than two sensors are placed in order to
get accurate data values and to deal with the case in
which one sensor is giving different values than the
rest of two sensors.
• To verify that the sensors in a system are functioning
properly requires debugging of sensor values.
• Another major issue is reliability of sensor data which
may arise due to the cyber threats.
Under such circumstances, provenance data can help to
identify the root cause of disruption in the system. Other
supporting examples elucidating the need for provenance
are discussed in [16].
3.2 Challenges and Constraints of a Provenance-
Aware IoT System
In this subsection, we address the challenges and constraints
of a Provenance-Aware IoT system keeping in view the
provenance as overhead for IoT devices that are highly
constrained in terms of physical size, available memory,
CPU power, and battery life. We have also identified re-
quirements and challenges for the integration of secure
provenance with IoT in [6] and [16] thoroughly.
In order to collect meta-data as provenance, it is im-
portant to consider the type of data to be collected that
can help to figure out the data inconsistencies or malicious
activities, for example, the ID of participating nodes, time-
stamps, sequence number, data flow (destination and source
Thing
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Fig. 4: Interconnection of RPL-connected things to the Internet through
the Border Router (BR).
information), etc. The granularity level of data being collected
further affects the provenance size. Provenance size defines
that “how many extra bytes in a packet are required to
be sent along with the data packet as data provenance”.
The provenance size ultimately affects network overhead and
performance overhead. Hence, the following two interlinked
factors are required to be considered for a provenance-
aware IoT system: (i) maintain provenance size to meet
the processing, storage and energy consumption constraints of
things and (ii) completeness of provenance information to
ensure the trustworthiness of data.
4 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the network model and the
data model that we consider for our proposed provenance
scheme for RPL networks. We also present the provenance
model along with the outline of elemental provenance data
components that are utilized in our proposed scheme. Fi-
nally, in the adversary model we discuss the anticipated
actions a malicious or compromised node can perform to
cause disruption in the network.
4.1 Network Model
We consider a RPL network (as shown in Fig. 4) where a
6LoWPAN border router (6BR) connects the RPL-connected
things in a 6LoWPAN network with the Internet. In RPL-
DODAG, a root node (typically a 6BR) performs the task of
data collection7 from nodes of a sub-DODAG and forwards
it to the Internet host that may process, interpret and ana-
lyze the sensor data.
The network is modeled as graph G(N , Rinfo) such that:
N = Ns, N1, . . . , Nn, Nr,
where N is the set of nodes consisting of source node
Ns, intermediate nodes (also referred to as forwarding
nodes or aggregator nodes) N1, . . . , Nn and root node Nr
while Rinfo is the set of routing edges representing the
path between the nodes traversed by a data packet i.e.,
〈destination, source〉. We consider the following assump-
tions for our network model:
• Nr has already acquired the knowledge of the
packet’s path (Ppath) via DAO messages.
• Nr has no constraints with respect to energy con-
sumption, storage space, security, and computa-
tional/processing capability.
• Each non-leaf node maintains a neighbouring table
(NT: contains information about parent node, child
7. We focus on Multipoint-to-Point (M2P) network scenarios.
5Data Seq# PD
Rinfo
〈destination node ID, source node ID〉
Fig. 5: Payload entries: data, sequence number, and provenance data
i.e., routing information as 〈destination node ID, source node ID〉
pair.
node(s), and neighbor/sibling nodes (see Fig. 1) and
a routing table (RT: contains information about node
child node(s) and their respective child nodes (see
Fig. 1).
• Routing paths may change over time due to node
failure, mobility, link quality degradation, conges-
tion, resource optimization etc. Hence, our model
adapts itself to both static and dynamic scenarios of
a sensor network.
4.2 Data Model
We assume that some of the sensor nodes referred to as
source nodes (Ns) in a network generate data packets (dp)
periodically. Ns forwards dp to another node referred to
as forwarding node (Nf ) that appears next on the path. The
packet path (Ppath) that is the path traversed by dp can be
represented as:
Ppath = Ns → Npp1 →, . . . ,→ Nppn → Nr,
i.e., the source child node (data-generating node) forwards
the packet to its preferred parent pp until it arrives at the
root node. For instance, in Fig. 1 node 7, 8, 9 and 10 are
data source nodes, node 2, 3, 4 and 5 are forwarding nodes
while node 6 aggregates data received simultaneously from
multiple node and acts as an aggregator node. We assume
aggregator node similar to a forwarding node as it is main-
taining routing information for each of the source node or
forwarding node.
The main components of a dp are: (i) a unique sequence
number S, (ii) data (also known as payload) d, (iii) packet
path Ppath refer to as provenance information or routing
information (Rinfo) (shown in Fig. 5), and (iv) Message
digest (MD) of Rinfo. We have used SHA-2 for computing
the MD. The MD included in the data packet is not used
in provenance encoding or decoding process. Hence, it is
not a part of the provenance and is used only to ensure the
provenance’s integrity.
4.3 Provenance Model
We consider a provenance-aware data model that keeps
track of:
a) Set of participating nodes (Nω) where Nω ⊂ N having
〈Parent, Child〉 relationship.
b) Data packet dp along with routing information8 (Rinfo)
encapsulated at each forwarding node Nf traversed by
dp.
c) Sequence number Si (extracted from d) against the rout-
ing entry9 (Re) in routing table (RT) at each forwarding
node Nf .
Hence, provenance data PD can be represented as:
Rinfo @ dp || Si @ RT. (1)
Thus, Rinfo represents the routing information in terms
of 〈Parent, Child〉 relationship and Si represents ith se-
quence number of ith data packet di maintained at RT of
Nf . It is important to note that || operator means that both
routing information and sequence numbers are stored in the
data packet and the routing table respectively and combina-
tion of both can be used to trace packet path, packet drop or
faulty node during provenance decoding. @ operator means
that Rinfo is embedded in dp while Si is maintained at RT.
The provenance data (PD), more specifically, in terms of
node-level and system level provenance can be represented
as:
RT ← Si, node-level provenance, (2a)
dp ← (Rinfo = 〈Np, Nc〉), system-level provenance.
(2b)
Thus, each Nf in Ppath keeps on updating Rinfo and
embeds it in the payload of dp while Si is embedded against
Re in RT.
4.4 Adversary Model
During the process of network operations (i.e., topology for-
mation and packet exchanging), only Nr is considered to be
a trusted entity. An adversary in the network may compro-
mise other benign nodes. The malicious node (Nm ∈ Nω)
can drop, inject, alter, replay or forge data packets that
ultimately imperils the trustworthiness of data. Here, we
have particularly consider Nm impersonating as Nf . Nr
may not be able to distinguish between benign or com-
promised nodes. Hence, Nr needs to verify the reliable
traversal of data through PD . In our proposed scheme, we
do not emphasize on the confidentiality of provenance data.
However, confidentiality can be achieved by encrypting the
provenance data by using the secret keys of the respective
nodes. Our proposed scheme aim to achieve the following
security properties:
a) Any malicious or faulty nodes are detectable.
b) Any malicious node can not remove provenance (node-
level or system-level) from the data packet without being
detected.
c) A malicious node cannot inject counterfeit information in
the provenance record or remove any benign node from
the provenance record.
8. Rinfo is represented as 〈Parent, Child〉 relationship.
9. Re is represented as next hop child node 〈Child〉.
6TABLE 1: Notations
Symbol Description
Psize Provenance size
PD Provenance data
dp Data packet
Ppath Packet path
Rinfo Routing information
Re Routing entry
pp Preferred parent
Ns, Nf , Nr Source node, Forwarding node, Root node
Np, Nc Parent node, Child node
5 PROVENANCE SCHEME
Due to the low power and lossy nature of RPL networks,
the data packets are subjected to packet loss because of
network disruptions (congestion, link failure) or spurious
attacks by malicious or compromised nodes. To identify
problematic or faulty node, the first step is identifying the
source node followed by identifying the forwarding nodes.
However, it requires to adopt some preliminary steps to be
taken at the time of data generation and data collection. In
Provenance-enabled Packet Path Tracing (PPPT) scheme, we
have introduced a path correlation provenance scheme that
generates provenance efficiently in terms of i) the routing
entry tagged with the sequence number of a data packet, ii)
routing information based on packet traversal.
In this section, we provide details of provenance en-
coding and decoding using flowcharts, algorithms and a
working example.
5.1 PPPT: Provenance Encoding
In RPL network topology, each parent node Np maintains
a route entry Re of its child node(s) Nc in a routing
table (RT). RT is a table at each Nf (when downward
routes are enabled) that keeps track of the routes origi-
nating from child nodes in the form of 〈Parent, Child〉.
During the process of establishing DODAG topology (as
discussed in Section 2.1), RT is populated with routing entry
based on next hop node as 〈Child〉. To track the detection
of lost packets and the malicious nodes responsible for
packet loss in the network we have introduced another
field sequence number Si that is added against each Re in
RT of node Ni. In addition to this, Rinfo is embedded
along with the payload (as shown in Fig. 6) in terms of
Did, Sid (〈destination node ID, source node ID〉) at each
Nf . Unlike existing research works that employs separate
transmission channels for data and provenance [34], we only
require a single channel for both.
To illustrate the working of provenance encoding let us
consider the topology shown in Fig. 6. Suppose N10 is a
data-generating node. To send a packet, N10 embeds Rinfo
as 〈6, 10〉 in dp and forwards the packet to its preferred
parent (pp) N6. Upon packet reception, (i) N6 extracts the
sequence number 1 from payload and inserts in it’s RT
againstRe 〈10〉, (ii) it updatesRinfo as 〈3, 6〉, (iii) it forwards
the packet to its pp i.e., N3. N3 follows the similar steps
by adding the sequence number against Re 〈6〉 (as shown
in Fig. 6a) and updating Rinfo (as shown in Fig. 6b) until
the packet arrives at N1. Thus, PD is maintained at RT in
terms of Si against Re at respective Nf in RT while Rinfo
Algorithm 1 Provenance Encoding
Input: dp
Output: Rinfo@dp , Si@RT
for each source node Ns do
Ns elects pp from its parent_list
Nd=Nid of pp . Nd refers to as next hop pp.
Ns=Nid of Ns
Rinfo ← 〈Nd, Ns〉 . insert Nd and Ns into Rinfo.
dp ← Rinfo . embed Rinfo in dp payload.
forward dp to pp
end for
for each forwarding node Nf do
extract Si from payload of dp
go to RT of Nf
look out for Re of 〈Nc〉 . Re refers to next
hop child node in RT.
Re@RT of Nf ← add_seq(Nc)
Rinfo ← 〈Nd, Nf 〉 . Nf refers to as immediate Nc.
update Rinfo in dp payload
end for
is maintained at dp. Fig. 7 shows provenance encoding
workflow at the participating nodes.
To provide a quick provenance assessment check at Nr , we
set a flag in the IPv6 extension header (EH) by utilizing the
available reserved bits. The bit is set at the time of prove-
nance embedding and is recovered upon packet reception
at the sink. The primary rationale of setting this bit is to
inform Nr about the presence of PD in the payload. As Nr
processed the main IPv6 header and EH first so it can know
about the presence of PD through the set bit. Moreover, if
any malicious node has dropped PD from the payload then
Nr can know about modification in the payload and can
simply discard the packet without further processing. Thus,
the set bit in EH enables efficient provenance decoding and
data trust assessment. Fig. 8 shows the processing order of
headers by Nr or 6BR.
Fig. 9 provides a detailed overview of the layer-2 packet
forwarding scenario from the source node S to the desti-
nation node R via intermediate nodes F1 and F2. The for-
warded unicast message includes MAC header, 6LoWPAN
header and Upper layer protocol data units (PDUs). During
each traversal, the intermediate node will look up in its
MAC address table to forward the unicast payload message
to the neighboring/preferred parent node until the packet
arrives at the root node.
Another way is to embed the node ID of each partici-
pating node in the packet traversal called as Provenance as
ID (PID) [16]. However, it will increase the provenance size
exponentially at each hop count. We compare PPPT with
PID in Section 7.4. In the case of PID, Rinfo takes the form
〈10, 6, 3, 1〉 after arriving at Nr .
Rinfo represents system-level provenance as it gives a
sheer picture of the participating node(s) in the network.
It is lossless because it is recording the complete ordered
packet traversal information. The root node extracts Rinfo
from dp for performing provenance decoding (discussed
in Section 5.2). On the other hand, maintaining sequence
number against Re in RT acts as node-level provenance. The
main goal of maintaining such information at each node
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(b) Rinfo in dp
Fig. 6: Provenance encoding: (a) embedding sequence number against routing entry in the RT of preferred parent. (b) enclosing routing information
in data packet at each forwarding node.
Start
dp @ Ns
Rinfo = <Nd,Ns>
embed Rinfo in dp
dp@Nf
extract seq# from dp
add seq# at Re of Nc 
dp arrive at Nr? End
No Yes
Re of Nc in RT of Np
Input
Nd=node ID of pp from parent list 
Ns=node ID of source node 
Input
forward packet
update Rinfo in dp 
<Nd,Nf>
forward packet
Fig. 7: Provenance encoding workflow at the participating nodes in the
network.
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is to point out the faulty node(s) or compromised node(s)
that are causing the packet drop attack. For instance, con-
gestion caused in the case of event regions as discussed by
[23] can be resolved by employing provenance information.
Similarly, a compromised node can be identified based on
packet count or packet delivery ratio (PDR) as it is causing
abnormal packet drop [24]. Considering the memory issues
of resource-constrained nodes, we have associated sequence
numbers with an interval I . At the end of each round
interval, the sequence numbers are reset at the RT of non-
root nodes, thus making room for newer data packets. Since
Nr does not have any constraint related to storage and
processing, therefore, we don’t need to reset the sequence
number entries in the RT of the root node. Moreover, the
complete provenance information can be checked from the
root node whenever required for system debugging etc.
It is important to note that the root node is maintaining
the information about all routing entries through which
packets have been traversed. For example, in the case of
node failure, root node will update its table entries ac-
cordingly by broadcasting DIO messages and thus enabling
nodes to select their preferred parent. In other words,
the root node is aware of the source nodes that generate
the data, forwarding nodes that forward the packets and
the packet path traversed by the packet. The knowledge
acquired by the root node during topology formation (or
network establishment) is used during the provenance ver-
ification process at the root node.
5.2 PPPT: Provenance Decoding
The root node upon packet reception performs the prove-
nance verification by extracting sequence number and rout-
ing information from the data packet by exploiting both
node-level and system-level provenance. Firstly, it extracts
both value i.e., Rinfo and Si from the payload of dp. Sec-
ondly, based on Si, Nr go to the RT of Nf and look out
for Re against Si. Nr continues the process until it traverses
the packet path and accumulates it in Ppath. Nr is able to
trace the packet traversal (as Ppath@Nr) through its RT that
contains an exhaustive view of the entire network topology.
Thirdly, after accumulating information in Ppath@dp, Nr
compares both Ppath@Nr and Ppath@dp. The provenance
is verified if both values are equal, otherwise Nr discards
the packet. The decoding steps are discussed in algo. 2.
The workflow shown in Fig. 10 summarizes the provenance
decoding process.
To explain the decoding process we again make reference
to Fig. 6a. N1 takes 〈N3〉 from Rinfo pair 〈N1, N3〉. It then
goes to the RT of 〈N3〉 and look out for the sequence number
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Fig. 10: Provenance processing workflow at the root node upon receiv-
ing a data packet.
1 maintained against Re which is 〈N6〉. To further carry on
the packet traversal, Nr goes to the RT of 〈N6〉. Here again
it look out for sequence number 1 against Re which is 〈N6〉.
Finally, it reaches the source generating node i.e., 〈N10〉.
After completion, it stores the result in Ppath@dp which is
then compared with Ppath@Nr for provenance verification.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security claims and their
justification to evaluate the performance of our proposed
provenance scheme.
Claim 1: Faulty nodes are detectable.
Justification: As a part of system-level provenance se-
quence number is embedded in the payload. Also as a
Algorithm 2 Provenance Decoding
Input: Si, Rinfo, Ppath@Nr
for each dp @ Nr do
fetch Nf from Rinfo . system_level provenance.
extract Si from dp . node_level provenance.
for each Si do
go to Re@RT of Nf . traverse Ppath.
look for Si against Re of Nc in RT
Ppath@dp ← Nid of Nf . construct packet path.
end for
end for
if Ppath@Nr==Ppath@dp then
return true . provenance is verified.
else
return false
end if
part of node-level provenance, the sequence number is
maintained at the parent node RT against the respective
child nodes as routing entries. The sequence number can
be tracked by the root node at each forwarding node for
detecting a faulty or a malicious node. Therefore, any ma-
licious node cannot selectively drop data packets without
being identified.
Claim 2: A malicious node can not remove provenance (node-
level or system-level) from the data packet without being detected.
Justification: Any malicious node may attempt to remove
the provenance data from the data packet. However, the flag
in the IPv6 EH is set showing the presence of provenance in
the data packet. Hence, upon the packet reception at the
sink node, the flag bit can provide an idea to the sink node
about the absence of provenance data in the data packet.
The sink node can simply discard the packet without further
processing.
Claim 3: A malicious node cannot inject counterfeit informa-
tion in the provenance record or remove any benign node from the
provenance record.
Justification: Since the sequence number is being inserted
in the routing table against the routing entries hence, even
if the adversary forges the routing information the routing
entries hold the information about the sequence numbers
along with routing entries.
97 SIMULATION
In this section, we have evaluated the performance of our
proposed provenance-enabled packet path tracing scheme
(PPPT) through simulation for linear topology. We analyze
the performance of PPPT with respect to provenance size,
provenance generation time, memory consumption (ROM
and ROM overhead), robustness, and energy consumption.
7.1 Simulation Setup
We run our experiments in Contiki-based network simulator
Cooja [25]. Contiki [26] has a well tested implementation of
RPL (ContikiRPL). For our simulations, we use Tmote Sky
[27] running ContikiMAC as things in 6LoWPAN networks.
ContikiMAC is a default Contiki RDC (Radio Duty Cycling)
protocol that allows nodes to keep their radio off for most
of the time (> 99%) and switch it on only when needed
to conserve energy while being able to relay multi-hop
messages. Tmote Sky uses CC2420 IEEE802.15.4 transceiver
and has 48KB of flash and 10KB of RAM. The parameters
associated with the simulation are shown in Table 2.
7.2 Performance Metrics
We analyze the performance of our proposed provenance
scheme using the following performance metrics:
7.2.1 Provenance Size
Any additional information or meta-data used to identify
the data source and packet path constitutes provenance data
(PD). The number of extra bytes in the data packet (as PD)
is referred to as provenance size (Psize) and can be defined
as:
Psize (bytes) = Payload− PD, (3)
where as PD can be represented as:
PD (bytes) = Rinfo @ Ni. (4)
Psize is considered to be a significant factor in the evaluation
of PPPT as it justifies the performance overhead of the
entire network.
In the case of PPPT, we only need to maintain tracing
information at each node as:
〈next_destination_node, current_source_node〉,
Hence, Psize remains constant throughout the packet traver-
sal and is irrespective of the number of hops count (i.e.,
number of nodes to be traversed by the data packet to
reach the destination/sink node) or the number of nodes
in the network. However, in the case of PID, it maintains
information about each traversed node as:
〈source_node, forwarding_node(s), destination_node〉.
Hence, Psize increases with the increase in the hop count.
7.2.2 Energy Consumption
Due to the resource-constrained nature of IoT network, we
have to consider network-level energy consumption and
node-level power consumption incurred due to the inclu-
sion of provenance information. In order to estimate power,
PowerTrace and Energest tools included in Contiki OS has
been used. The time each mote spends in the states includ-
ing transmitting time (Tx) (i.e., the radio is transmitting with
the MCU on), receiving time (Rx) (i.e., the radio is receiving
with the MCU on), low power mode (LPM) (i.e., the MCU
is idle and the radio is off), and processing/CPU time (the
MCU is on and the radio is off) can be determined through
these tools.
Based on the nominal values (the typical operating con-
ditions of the Tmote Sky) available in [27], the network-wide
energy usage for 600 sec by all the nodes can be calculated
as:
Energy (mJ) = (Tx ∗ 19.5mA+Rx ∗ 21.8mA
+CPU ∗ 1.8mA+ LPM ∗ 0.0545) ∗ 3V
/32768 ∗ 8.
(5)
From the network-wide energy usage, we calculate the
average power as:
Power (mW ) =
Energy (mJ)
Time (s)
. (6)
To compute per-node average power consumption for
the node’s active time period, power is divided by the total
number of nodes. We have measured energy consumption
by using both radio duty cycling and non-duty cycling.
We have used contikimac_driver for duty cycling and null-
rdc_driver for non-duty cycling.
7.2.3 Packet Drop Detection Rate (PDDR)
The packets are subjected to loss due to various anoma-
lies including node failure, mobility, or link failure during
transmission. In addition to the malicious activity, packet
loss may also occur even in the case of benign network
situation. By computing the ratio between the number of
packets detected as dropped to the number of packets that
are actually dropped, we can evaluate the robustness of
PPPT. Following this correlation, if lp represents detected
dropped packet and tp represents actual dropped packet
then PDDR can be computed as:
PDDR =
lp
tp
. (7)
7.2.4 Average Provenance Generation Time
Provenance generation time can be defined as the time
(including the other network processing delays) required
by the forwarding node to embed provenance and forward
the data packet to the next neighboring or preferred parent
node.
PGT (min) = tn − tn−1, (8)
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TABLE 2: Network parameters used in simulation analysis
Parameter Value
Network layer RPL
MAC layer 802.15.4
Simulation time 600 s
Radio medium Unit Disk Graph Medium(UDGM):Distance Loss10
Topology Linear
Number of forwarding nodes varying from 1 to 7
Packet size (excluding header) 200 bytes
Data rate varying from 1 packet/10 sec to 1 packet/40 sec
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Fig. 11: (a) Network-level energy consumption with respect to varying data rates at different hop counts. (b) Node-level average power
consumption with respect to varying data rates at different hop counts.
TABLE 3: Additional RAM and ROM required by PPPT.
Overhead RAM (Bytes) ROM (Bytes)
Additional storage 504 3874
where tn and tn−1 represents the time taken by nth node
and n − 1th node respectively. The average provenance
generation time can be computed as follows:
Average PGT (min) =
m∑
i=1
PGTni
m
,
(9)
where PGTni represents the time consumed by a node ni
and m represents the number of packets being forwarded.
7.3 RAM and ROM Usage
Since IoT devices have limited ROM and RAM resources,
therefore it is important to ensure that the additional over-
head in terms of provenance is optimized for these environ-
ments. In order to quantify ROM and RAM usage by our
proposed scheme, we have used the msp430-size tool. Table
3 shows the RAM and ROM overhead of provenance-based
RPL scheme (PPPT) as an additional storage overhead with
reference to RPL-only.
7.4 Simulation Results
Fig. 11a shows network-wide energy usage in a duty-cycled
RPL-based network with varying data rates (i.e., the number
10. UDGM:Distance Loss models the transmission range as a circle in
which only the nodes inside the circle receive packets while considering
interference.
of packets sent per second) at different hop counts. We may
conclude that the suitable data rate for provenance-enabled
RPL-based networks can be around 1 packet/20 seconds
to 1 packet/30 seconds, whereas 1 packet/40 seconds can
be considered as an ideal data rate. Moreover, the overall
energy consumption by nodes in the network is loosely
linked with the hop counts.
Fig. 11b shows average power consumption per-node
against varying data rates. Here, per-node power decreases
with the increase in data rate as fewer packets are being
sent thereby utilizing less power. Hence, we can infer that
per-node power consumption is more likely to be related
to the data rate and less likely to be related with the hop
count, similar to network-level energy consumption. Fig. 12
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Fig. 12: Comparison between RPL-only and provenance-based RPL (PPPT)
showing average power consumption per node.
shows a comparison of node level power consumption in
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a RPL-based provenance-enabled network.
a duty-cycled network between RPL-only (without prove-
nance) and PPPT (provenance-enabled RPL). By examining
the results, we can see that power consumption is almost
negligible in case of PPPT. In some cases, it is even less than
RPL-only. This is because of reason that we are utilizing the
available framework i.e., routing table for storing node-level
information.
Fig. 13 shows another perspective of the results shown
in Fig. 11b. Here, we can see that the average power
consumption of per-node is more closely concerned with
the data rate rather than the hop count. Hence, increase
in the hop count may not affect much on per-node power
consumption. However, it is evident from the result that as
the data rate increases, the average power consumption per-
node decreases. Fig. 14 shows average power consumption
per-node without duty-cycling in a RPL-based network.
Here, we can see that as the number of hops are increasing,
average power consumption per node is decreasing. This
is because the nodes are operating without duty-cycling
i.e., the radio is always on and nodes never sleep, hence
power consumption is irrespective of the number of hops.
Fig. 15 shows the comparison of proposed scheme with BF-
based schemes [10], [11] and PID [16] in terms of provenance
size (Psize) at different hop counts. In the case of PID, PD
consists of the node IDs of all of the participating nodes that
are responsible for carrying the data. Hence, Psize increases
with the increase in the number of hops. More specifically,
Psize (bytes) will be the same as that of hop count. However,
in the case of PPPT, PD includes next destination node ID
and current source node ID at each respective hop on the
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Fig. 15: Comparison of provenance size among PPPT, BF [10], [11] and
PID [16] at different hop counts.
packet path. Therefore, Psize remains constant i.e. 2 bytes
(one byte for source node ID and one byte for destination
node ID). We have also computed Psize for the BF-based
schemes that uses a fixed size BF to encode all the nodes on
a packet’s path using a set of hash functions. Psize for the
BF scheme is determined by the size of the BF. Fig. 16 shows
that Psize remains 2 bytes irrespective of number of packets
sent by varying data source nodes. On the other hand, for
BF scheme Psize is much greater i.e., 18 bytes.
The result in Fig. 17a shows that the higher the link loss
rate is, the more the detection rate decreases. It is observed
that as the link loss rate increases from 3% to 9%, the
probability of consecutive packet drops also increases. In
order to detect packet drop attack, we perform a simulation
in a 8-hop network and set node ID 3 as a malicious node.
We also fix the natural link loss rate to 1%, and vary the
malicious link loss rate to 3%, 6%, and 9%. Fig. 17b shows
the packet loss rate over the number of packets sent for a
period of time. The malicious node drops data packets ran-
domly, which eventually drops down the packet reception
rate at the sink node. It can be concluded from the results
that the packet loss rate for a benign network converges to
the natural link loss rate. In contrast, due to the presence of
malicious node, the packet loss rate gradually increases and
ultimately reaches at a point that is higher than the natural
loss rate i.e., 1%.
Fig. 18a and Fig. 18b shows the average packet process-
ing time (PPT) (min) including other network processing
delays. In Fig. 18a we can see that as the number of hops
increases, the average PPT also increases, which is off-course
natural in multi-hop network. The overall average PPT
between RPL-only and Provenance-enabled RPL (PPPT) is
nearly 0.006 and 0.017 min respectively, which is almost
negligible. On the other hand, in Fig. 18b as the number
of sent packets increases, PPT almost remains the same. The
required average processing time for Provenance-enabled
RPL (PPPT) and RPL-only is 0.035 and 0.014 min respec-
tively, which is again almost negligible.
8 RELATED WORK
The interconnectivity of 6LoWPAN networks with the Inter-
net raises serious security concerns, as resource-constrained
things are globally accessible anywhere from the untrusted
12
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Fig. 18: Comparison between RPL-only and Provenance-based RPL (PPPT) for average packet processing time with respect to (a) number of hops,
(b) number of packets sent.
Internet. An attacker may attempt to disrupt the data gen-
erated by nodes either by inserting malicious nodes or by
compromising benign nodes. Such forging or alteration of
data produces catastrophic results, especially for applica-
tions relying on data for critical decision-making processes,
risk assessment, and performance evaluation. To enable the
data trustworthiness among IoT devices, provenance can be
deployed.
Extensive research has been carried out on network
provenance. However, due to limited computational abil-
ity, energy constraints, and low bandwidth, the traditional
provenance schemes, for instance, [28]–[30] cannot be ap-
plied to WSNs environment directly. Similarly, the con-
cept of hop-by-hop tracing (or IP tracing) [31] can be
mapped to provenance, however, it is not well-suited to
WSNs due to its large storage requirement. Therefore,
existing provenance schemes developed for conventional
wired networks cannot be applied directly to WSNs due to
both the resource-tightened nature of WSNs and the rapid
provenance size increase [32]. In sensor networks, [9]–[11]
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TABLE 4: Quick overview of Lossy and Lossless Provenance schemes for WSNs
Scheme Methodology Used Weakness Provenance Type
[9]–[11] Use bloom filter (BF) to record node IDs.
i) Requires large sized BF to avoid
high false positives.
ii) Only maintains node IDs as prove-
nance information hence unable to
construct packet path’s topology.
lossy
[12] Use probabilistic methods (including
rank, prime and Rabin fingerprints) to
incorporate the node IDs in the packet
path.
i) Use of computationally intensive
methods to encode provenance.
ii) Frequent changes in data flow
paths tends to scatter the prove-
nance across several packets and
thus incurs high decoding error
rates.
lossy
[13] Maintains a dictionary to record packet
path. i) Requires stable WSNs otherwise
the packet may not reuse a packet
path resulting in no compression at
all.
lossless
[14], [15] Use Arithmetic Coding to encode
provenance as a coding interval. [14]
use global probabilities to encode
provenance while [15] use local proba-
bilities to encode provenance.
i) Requires training phase to assign
the occurrence probability to each
node.
ii) Requires transmitting two real
numbers as coding interval which
expands the provenance size.
iii) Requires the WSNs to stay station-
ary after deployment to avoid dras-
tic modification of the occurrence
frequencies and the probabilities
assigned to the nodes.
lossless
proposed a provenance scheme that employ append-based
data structures (bloom filter) to store provenance. In-packet
bloom filter based provenance scheme works by embedding
all nodes on a packet’s path in the BF using a set of hash
functions. Upon packet retrieval, the BS retrieves the nodes
on the path based on a certain false positive rate that is
proportional to the size of the BF i.e., the larger the BF size,
the lower the false positive rate.
The authors of [12] proposed a probabilistic approach to
encode the node identity into the provenance as an exten-
sion of IP traceback problem [33]. In this approach, each
node makes an independent decision whether to embed
its identity into the packet or not. Upon packet retrieval,
the BS constructs provenance by exploiting partial path
information collected from a number of received packets.
The main drawbacks associated with these lossy prove-
nance schemes are that (i) only nodes’ IDs are recorded as the
provenance information, (ii) increase in the provenance size
with the number of nodes traversed, (iii) employ append-
based data structures to store provenance leading to pro-
hibitive costs and high decoding error rates, (iv) high energy
and bandwidth dissipation due to provenance size, and (v)
provenance data loss.
Some lossless provenance schemes have been designed
to address the problem of increased provenance size in
multi-hop networks by using data provenance compression.
For instance, [13] proposed a dictionary-based provenance
scheme by enclosing path index in the packet’s path. In this
scheme each node constructs a dictionary for a compressed
packet’s path. The BS retrieves the path of the received
packet by looking up the dictionary stored in it. [15] pro-
posed an arithmetic coding-based provenance scheme. This
scheme assigns each node a global cumulative probabil-
ity according to a node occurrence probability among all
the used packet paths. [14] presents an extension of [15].
In this scheme, authors proposed an incremental cluster-
based arithmetic coding scheme for encoding provenance in
packet. Due to clustering-based mechanism the provenance
on each layer can be encoded as an independent segment.
Moreover, provenance is encoded through local probabil-
ities rather than global probabilities thereby providing a
higher compression rate.
The main drawbacks associated with these techniques
are that (i) unstable topology makes it hard to construct the
packet path dictionaries leading to no compression at all, (ii)
training phase is required in order to assign the occurrence
probability to each node and, (iii) WSNs are required to stay
stationary after deployment to avoid drastic modification of
the occurrence frequencies and the probabilities assigned to
the nodes. Table 4 gives a quick overview of the methodol-
ogy used and drawbacks associated with the existing lossy
and lossless provenance schemes.
As the proposed PPPT scheme for RPL-based IoT de-
vices is exploiting the existing features in RPL, hence, the
shortcomings associated with lossy and lossless provenance
schemes are feasible to resolve. For instance, the routing
information is already maintained in routing table while
sequence number is added against the routing information
as a part of node-level information. Moreover, the current
14
source node ID and next hop node ID are embedded as
a part of system-level information, thereby reducing the
provenance size to a constant size of 2 bytes. Similarly,
the establishment of topology follows a proactive approach
where the routing information is maintained in the routing
table before sending packets.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a provenance-enabled
packet path tracing (PPPT) scheme for RPL-connected IoT
devices to ensure the objective of data trustworthiness dur-
ing packet traversal from source to destination. We have
introduced node-level provenance by embedding sequence
number against routing entry at the routing table of the re-
spective forwarding node. In addition to node-level prove-
nance, we have also added system-level provenance that
captures the complete packet trace by including destination
and source node ID pairs. The combination of both node
and system level provenance verifies the provenance. Ex-
perimental results show that our scheme reduces the size of
provenance and can save more energy and bandwidth with
respect to BF-based schemes. Furthermore, the provenance
generation time and average power consumption between
RPL-only and provenance-based RPL is almost negligible.
We like to introduce provenance scheme for the non-storing
mode in RPL as a part of our future work.
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